Chapter 1

History of Modern Personality Theory and Research

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Why would you want to read this chapter? To be sure, any science has a history; but the history of a science, while a legitimate field of scholarly inquiry, is usually quite separate from the science itself. Few chemists are concerned with Johann Becher's now-discredited phlogiston theory or Dmitri Mendeleev's life and how he came to construct the periodic table of the elements. If psychological science is concerned with what is true now, why bother with what people used to think was true? Why, then, a history of personality psychology?

USES OF A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

We suggest three important reasons for personality psychologists to know something of their history. First, origins are intrinsically interesting, even compelling. As Freud (1908/1959b) once suggested, the question "Where did I come from?" may be the child's "first grand problem of life" (p. 212). Origins are often a critical part of adult identity (witness people's interest in genealogy). In fact, the history of psychology is of increasing interest to psychologists, as manifest in the new APA journal, History of Psychology. In this chapter, then, we offer an outline of the "family history" of personality psychology.

Second, the study of history can help us avoid making the same journeys over the same terrain, repeating the mistakes of the past. If we know what has gone before, we may discover that some questions have been asked before, perhaps even answered! As the philosopher Santayana (1906) cautioned, "Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. . . . When experience is not retained . . . infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (p. 284).

Further, any discipline is the way it is because its early workers formulated certain questions and framed certain key concepts. By under-
standing how our field evolved and was constructed—by particular psychologists, in particular social contexts—we gain a broader perspective on contemporary questions and issues. For example, Gordon Allport's decision to ratify "trait" as the key concept for the newly emerging field of personality (Allport, 1927) had important consequences in framing such later issues as the ways in which personality is measured, stability versus change, the roles of "personality" and "situation" in the explanation of behavior, and the relationship between trait and other personality constructs such as motive (Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998).

Finally, no science is divorced from its surrounding social conditions and values-climate. For example, any attempt to study the psychology of personality presumes the belief that "personality" is important and worth explaining. This belief, in turn, rests on a philosophical individualism and a view of the individual as cause or agent. Because Americans are particularly likely to hold such individualistic beliefs and reluctant to acknowledge the importance of collectivities (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985), it is not surprising that "personality" has been a major focus of psychological inquiry as well as popular culture in the United States (see Susman, 1979). One observer suggested that "no country in the world is so driven by personality as this one" and that Americans have a "hunger to identify with larger-than-life personalities." ("Only spectacular crimes," 1994). Our historical account, therefore, will emphasize developments in the United States. It should be taken as building upon earlier historical handbook chapters by Burnham (1968), Pervin (1990), McAdams (1997) and Runyan (1997)—and, indeed, on those entire earlier handbooks.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

The modern psychological study of personality, which began to flourish during the early decades of the 20th century, has roots in 19th-century intellectual themes: a deep belief in individualism, a pervasive concern with irrationality and the unconscious, and a strong emphasis on measurement. Although these three themes are by no means fully consistent with each other and not every personality psychologist emphasized all three, they did shape (and limit) the emerging field of personality psychology in important ways that can still be recognized.

Individualism and the "Skin-Bounded" Individual

Personality psychology evolved and flourished in the Western philosophical-political climate of individualism—the belief that individuals are important and unique. Such a discipline would be unlikely to develop in a homogeneous society in which everyone lived through the same small set of life cycles. Thus the cultural historian Burekhardt (1860/1954) concluded that in the Middle Ages, people were conscious of themselves "only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation—only through some general category" (p. 101). After the Renaissance, however, people recognized themselves as individuals.

From the individualist perspective, "persons," the very subject matter of personality psychology, are construed as single bodies, bounded by skin. Anything else (objects and environments, intimate partners, other people, family, solidary groups, communities, institutions, cultures) is construed as "outside," wholly external to the autonomous skin-bounded individual person. From this perspective, they only exist and are understood as internal representations, objects of contractual relations, or encroachments on the individual.

The individualistic perspective, however, leads to a paradox: Often we do not seem so very different from each other. For example, the many studies of bogus personality feedback (Dickson & Kelly, 1985) suggest that people readily accept uniform, standardized feedback as an accurate description of their own "individual" selves. And Singer (1995), after studying thousands of college students' self-stories, was "overwhelmed by the narrative similarities they bring to the important events in their lives." (p. 452, emphasis added). Further, an excessively individualistic perspective can blind psychologists to the importance of collective aspects of personality such as groups, social identities, and cultural symbols.

The Unconscious

In revolt against the 18th-century "age of reason," the 19th-century Romantic movement exalted the role of unconscious and irrational emotions, spontaneity, and impulsivity in literature,
the arts, and philosophy. In personality psychology, this influence was most obvious in psychoanalysis, particularly Freud's concepts of id and primary process. The notion of an unconscious still survives today, albeit in a muted and less grandiloquent form, in the claim that many important processes are implicit or automatic—that is, they operate outside of conscious awareness (Kihlström, 1990, and Chapter 17, this volume; see also Bargh, 1982; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Still, an exclusive focus on unconscious or implicit forces may lead to a neglect or underestimation of the importance of rational planning and directed behavior (see Cantor & Zirkel, 1990).

Emphasis on Measurement

In devoting an extraordinary amount of attention to issues of measurement and psychometrics, personality psychology tried to follow in the footsteps of the prestigious "exact sciences" that had developed so rapidly in the late 19th century. The modern emphasis on precision and measurement was prefigured in the writings of British scientist and statistician Sir Francis Galton (1884): "The character which shapes our conduct is a definite and durable "something," and therefore . . . it is reasonable to attempt to measure it" (p. 179). In the early 20th century, American experimental psychologist E. L. Thorndike (1914) insisted that "if a thing exists, it exists in some amount; and if it exists in some amount, it can be measured" (p. 141; emphasis in original).

The prestige of Binet and the early intelligence "tests" also increased the concern with measurement in personality psychology. A rapidly developing assessment technology led to a number of paper and pencil "tests" of personality, modeled after the early intelligence tests and consisting of questionnaire "items" intended to measure the "traits" of personality. Later on, personality psychologists expanded their measurement technology to include ratings and behavior observations.

The emphasis on measurement also fits with the imperative, strongly felt by personality psychology in its beginning decades, to be useful to furnish assistance to a corporate culture and a government suddenly confronted by dramatic changes and the need to "manage" and control an American population that had suddenly become larger, more diverse, and "difficult" (Parker, 1991). This point is nicely illustrated by the example of Woodworth's Personal Data Sheet, which was probably the first personality test based on the IQ test model of adding "scores" on discrete individual "items" to get a total. By the time the United States finally entered the war in April 1917, the experience of other armies suggested that many soldiers were vulnerable to "shell shock" or "war neurosis." (Nowadays this would probably be called posttraumatic stress disorder.) The American Psychological Association quickly set up a committee charged with developing a diagnostic test of "susceptibility to shock," which was conceived as one aspect of a broader general emotional instability (Canfield, 1969, pp. 126, 131–132). Acting without the benefit of much prior knowledge or technique, Robert Woodworth collected a long list of symptoms from the case histories of "neurotic subjects" and turned them into a series of 116 simple questions that could be answered Yes or No (for example, "Do you usually feel well and strong?" or "Has your family always treated you right?"). Overall scores, calculated by summing scores of the individual items, differentiated "normal" soldiers from diagnosed neurotics or returned "shell shock" cases (Woodworth, 1919, 1932, p. 374). The resulting Personal Data Sheet was the first objective, self-report "inventory" purporting to measure a personality characteristic, in this case what was later labeled Neuroticism.

A focus on measurement was obviously beneficial to any science that aspired to prestige by developing along the traditional positivistic path blazed by 19th-century physics. Conversely, it was a handicap insofar as it constrained the scope of investigation and explanation to that which was easily measured, thereby neglecting more subtle and complex personality characteristics and processes. For example, self-report questionnaires constructed on the IQ-test "item" model are sensitive only to conscious (rather than implicit) sentiments. They are usually based on the atomistic assumption that a complex whole can be broken down into a series of small component parts, each of which is equal to every other and all of which combine in additive (rather than interactive or nonlinear) ways. In this respect, the "measurement imperative" of personality psychology sometimes resembled the famous joke about the drunken man who had lost his keys on the dark side of the street but looked for them on the (other) lighted side, "because that's where the light is."
THE TWO TASKS OF PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

From its earliest days, American personality psychology involved two related but contrasting endeavors: (1) the study of individual differences, or the dimensions along which people differ from each other, and (2) the study of individual persons as unique, integrated wholes (see, e.g., Lamiell, 1997; McAdams, 1997; Murphy, 1932; Sanford, 1963). These two endeavors have been variously labeled as "analytic" versus "structural," or "quantitative" versus "qualitative," respectively. According to one early commentator (Young, 1928):

A review of the whole gamut of personality studies . . . reveals two essentially distinct approaches to the data. One of these, which has been developed by recent psychology, concerns itself with a cross-sectional treatment of personality in terms of traits, attitudes and habits. The other, which has arisen from a number of sources, especially psychiatry, treats personality from a functional, historical-genetic standpoint. (p. 431)

Much of the difference between these two approaches is also captured by the "nomothetic-individualistic" dichotomy—terms first used by Windelband (1894/1904), later adopted by Allport (1937), and still a lively topic at the end of the century (West, 1983; see also Lamiell, 1998).

The Psychometric "Analysis" Approach

Discussing the analytic or quantitative approach, Murphy (1932) characterized its view of personality as the "sum of all of an individual's traits" (p. 386). In his view, psychologists who measured and studied the intercorrelations of separate personality traits conceived of personality "as the answer to a complicated arithmetical problem" (p. 386). The practical goal of personality research was to predict, modify, and control behavior, with individual differences conceived as coefficients to be supplied to linear, additive prediction equations.

Influence of Intelligence Testing

We have called this the "psychometric" approach because, according to an early reviewer, it "owes its prominence to the work of Galton, Pearson, Cattell, Thorndike and Terman with their investigations of individual differences, particularly in the field of intelligence" (Young, 1928, p. 431). During the first two decades of the 20th century, psychologists had developed "mental tests" for selection, diagnosis, and placement, as psychologists tried to demonstrate their usefulness in solving urgent practical problems associated with immigration, labor unions, and schools, as well as the 1917-1918 national war mobilization (Danziger, 1990; Parker, 1991; Vernon, 1933; see Schaffer, 1991, pp. 133-139, on the effects of World War I in particular).

In the post-World War I period, however, many critics questioned the predictive utility of intelligence tests in various applied settings (Parker, 1991) and suggested that measures of personality or character traits were needed to improve the prediction of military, managerial, industrial, and educational performance (see, e.g., Ferrando, 1920; Poffenberger, 1922; Pressey, 1921). Still, these newer "character tests" were based on the mental test model in preference to other, less "efficient" methods (Parker, 1991). The content of trait measures also reflected practical demands: "Ascendence—Submission," and "Extraversion—Introversion," considered relevant to selecting business managers and military officers, received the greatest attention (Danziger, 1990; Parker, 1991).

"Mental Hygiene" and Personality

Yet another important influence on the psychometric approach to personality during the 1920-1930 period was the so-called mental hygiene movement. This well-funded alliance of psychiatrists, educators, and social workers viewed individual maladjustment as the root cause of a wide variety of social and personal problems (S. Cohen, 1983; see also Parker, 1991). With its "personality" focus, the movement enlisted psychologists to supply a "scientific" basis for the therapeutic efforts of mental hygiene workers. As Danziger (1990) noted, "in practice this generally came down to the construction and application of scales that would subject 'personality' to the rigor of measurement and so convert it from merely an object of social intervention to an object of science" (p. 164).

"Science" or "Servant"?

The continuing concern of personality psychologists to demonstrate the practical useful-
ness of their work on measuring individual differences suggests the need for viewing history from a political and moral perspective. In fact, most of the "practical social problems" personality psychologists tried to solve were problems faced (and framed) by elite groups: selecting managers who could maximize profits; selecting military officers who could win wars; controlling an increasingly diverse population in the country's schools; factories, crowded cities, and prisons; and controlling "deviant" behavior, at least to the extent of promoting labels suggesting individual pathology instead of social problems. Not surprisingly, the "solutions" supplied by personality psychologists tended to leave existing power relations intact or even reinforced, because the intellectual roots of personality psychology—radical individualism, supported by the mystique of "science"—were quite compatible with the ideological stance of the ruling elites who financed the research. Thus the practically oriented psychometric approach to personality psychology runs the danger of becoming a technology that deliberately or unwittingly functions mainly to serve the interests of the powerful.

The Psychiatric and Historical "Interpretation" Approach

Murphy (1932) contrasted the psychometric approach to personality with the psychiatric focus on "personality as a whole," observing that psychiatric conceptions "added much to the richness of the term 'personality'" by introducing topics such as dissociation and unconscious mental processes (p. 387). Young (1928) was especially enthusiastic about this historical-interpretive approach (though he noted that at the time of his writing, it "has had very little attention from the psychologists," p. 437): "[It] has arisen from the study of literary biography, from historical biography, but especially from psychiatry and sociology. Here we find the great biographers, the psychoanalysts led by Freud, Jung and Adler, the invaluable work of Healy [a neurologist] and latterly the sociological reformulation of W. I. Thomas" (p. 431).

Mainstream psychologists ignored or criticized biographical and case study methods and were (at least initially) quite hostile toward psychoanalysis (Danziger, 1990, 1997, especially p. 125). Given their concern for scientific respectability via sophisticated quantitative techniques, it is not surprising that they viewed the case study methods of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts as part of an "old-fashioned and unscientific" medical tradition (Hale, 1971, p. 115).

Discussing the case study literature in their review of personality, Allport and Vernon (1930) noted the contributions of psychiatrists and psychologists (rather than psychoanalysts) and echoed the prevailing view that the method was "unsatisfactory." However, they went on to suggest that "the concrete individual has eluded study by any other approach" and concluded with the hope that "in the future there will undoubtedly be attempts to standardize the case-study in some way which will reduce its dependence upon the uncontrolled artistry of the author" (p. 700).

The whole-person or interpretive approach to personality had been especially prominent in German psychology during the first three decades of the 20th century. Influenced by the philosopher Dilthey's view of psychology as a "human science" (Geisteswissenschaft), it emphasized the ways in which personality characteristics and other psychological processes were organized or patterned within the unique individual. Writing for an American audience about the German qualitative approach to the "undivided" personality, Allport summarized this perspective: "More fundamental than differential psychology [i.e., the psychometric focus on dimensions of difference among people], by far, is the problem of the nature, the activity, and the unity of the total personality" (Allport, 1923, p. 614; emphasis in original). Allport traced the German emphasis on structured " wholes" in Gestalt psychology, the personalistic psychology of William Stern, and Eduard Spranger's method of "intuitive understanding" (Verstehen) (Allport, 1923, 1924a, 1924b, 1929).

However, Allport's early attempts to introduce this approach to personality to American psychologists apparently met with little response. Vernon (1933) noted that most American psychologists were either unaware of the German qualitative approach or else found it scientifically unacceptable.

The Uneasy Coalition between "Analysis" and "Interpretation" Approaches

For the past 70 years, the two approaches to personality psychology—the study of individual personality differences and the study of individual persons—have existed in an uneasy coalition or truce. As part of their efforts to broaden (and systematize) personality, Allport (1937) and
Murray (1938) tried to move the field toward studying persons as integrated wholes, but as several later commentators noted, personality psychologists generally avoided studies of individual lives through most of the century (see, e.g., Carlson, 1971; McAdams & West, 1997; Runyan, 1997).

Even Allport and Murray seemed ambivalent about case studies. As a journal editor and professor, Allport advocated studying individual persons (see, e.g., Allport, 1924b, 1929, 1937, 1942) and tried (unsuccessfully) to develop a set of systematic rules for writing life histories (Allport, 1967; see also Barenbaum, 1997a, 1997c; Garraty, 1981). Yet he himself actually published only one case study (Allport, 1965), and much of his research involved nomothetic traits (Allport, 1928; Vernon & Allport, 1931). Situated within Harvard’s scientifically oriented academic department of psychology, Allport opted for a moderate, eclectic approach that included both analytic and interpretive methods (see Nicholson, 1997a, but also Pandora, 1997).

Situated as a maverick in opposition to the “scientific” Harvard department (Robinson, 1992), Murray still needed to justify his foundation support on the basis of the “scientific” status of his work (see also Triplet, 1983, 1992). Although Murray’s group developed elaborate procedures for the intensive study of individual persons, their book (Murray, 1938) actually included only one case. Later, in establishing an assessment program for the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Murray modified his “diagnostic council” method even more in the direction of more quantitative assessments (McLeod, 1992).

From a historical perspective, it is easy to see that the psychometric tradition was already well established in psychology by the time that personality emerged as a separate field, so that this prior “triumph of the aggregate” (Danziger, 1997, p. 68) led to an early dominance of the “individual differences” tradition over the “study of individuals” tradition. For example, when the American Psychological Association took over publication of the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (from the psychiatrically oriented American Psychopathological Association) in 1925, the publication pattern changed dramatically (Danziger, 1990):

What was given up was an earlier tradition of detailed study of individuals. . . . Whereas in 1924[,] 80 percent of the empirical papers published were based on the study of individual cases, that proportion dropped to 25 percent in the following year. Their place was taken by statistical studies based on group data, as was required by the prevailing Galtonian paradigm for psychological measurement. (p. 165)

The marginal status of studies of individual persons in personality psychology, then, really continues an early trend. Yet interest in individual cases has continued to survive—at first mainly among students and associates of Allport and Murray (e.g., Polansky, 1941; Rosenzweig, 1943; White, 1952), but in recent years among a much broader and larger array of personality psychologists (Runyan, 1997, p. 42; see the review by McAdams & West, 1997; also the collections edited by Franz & Stewart, 1994, and McAdams & Ochshorn, 1988).

1921–1946: THE CRITICAL FORMATIVE ERA OF PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

We suggest that while the “official” emergence of personality psychology is often dated by the appearance of the “canonical” texts by Allport (1937), Murray (1938), and Stagner (1937), it really began at least 15 years earlier. The 1921–1938 period was a time of intense research activity; the years between 1938 and 1946 were really the consolidation of “modern” personality concepts and methods, as well as the widespread institutional recognition of personality as a specialty within psychology departments (Danziger, 1990; 1997; Parker, 1991). We first review the period before the canonical texts, then discuss the latter period in terms of the influence of three major figures who had substantial and enduring impact on the field: Gordon Allport (1897–1967), Henry Murray (1893–1988), and Raymond Cattell (1905–1998).

Origins: The Decade of the 1920s

The first American review of the psychological literature on “personality and character” appeared in 1921 (Allport, 1921). Most of the various sources cited by Allport involved traits, which suggests that the trait concept had already achieved a theoretical dominance by that time (Danziger, 1990; Parker, 1991). The article
focused primarily on the distinction between "personality" and "character," two concepts that had been used interchangeably by American psychologists up to that time. In agreement with the behaviorists, Allport suggested that the latter term, defined as "the personality evaluated according to prevailing standards of conduct" (p. 443), was not an appropriate topic for psychological study. Allport continued to advocate the use of "personality" in preference to "character" (1927; Allport & Vernon, 1930); this soon became standard practice, not only for reasons of scientific respectability but also on account of a cultural shift from moralism to pragmatism (Nicholson, 1998).

A "Personality" Journal

Before the 20s, the term "personality" had been used primarily in discussions of abnormal psychology, which was considered to be the province of the medical specialty of psychiatry (Parker, 1991). Another indication that the field of personality was emerging as a separate and autonomous area of psychological research was the 1921 expansion of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology into the Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, with Floyd Allport as an additional editor, "in cooperation with" Morton Prince. In a joint editorial, they noted that psychopathologists and social psychologists shared an interest in the "dynamics of human nature" and invited contributions on a number of topics, including "the foundation study of human traits" and "the personality of the individual" (Prince & Allport, 1921, p. 2). The lead article of the first issue of the expanded journal was the study of personality traits by the Allport brothers (Allport & Allport, 1921).

Seven years later, Prince and Moore (1928) introduced a special issue of the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology devoted to personality with the observation that "the rapidly increasing number of manuscripts dealing with problems of temperament, character and personal traits shows that an extraordinary pressure of investigational effort is being directed toward this subject which until quite recently numbered but a few brief pages in any standard textbook of psychology." They noted the "necessity of ever widening approaches and more manifold studies," and concluded with a prophetic reference to "the complex task that faces the author of a Psychology of Personality ten years hence" (p. 117).

Institutional Developments

By the end of the 1920s there were several institutional indicators of the widespread interest in personality as a field of psychology. During the period 1923–1928, the American Psychological Association responded to its members' increasing interest in personality by scheduling convention sessions on "character" and "personality," sometimes in the practical context of vocational guidance or selection (Parker, 1991). Similar developments occurred at other conferences and meetings. Support for personality research came from a variety of foundations. Other signs of recognition of the new discipline included the founding of the journal Character and Personality (later renamed Journal of Personality) in 1932, and the 1934 addition of "personality" as a category in the Psychological Abstracts (Parker, 1991).

Allport: Defining and Systematizing the Field of Personality

Gordon Allport's early efforts to define and systematize the field of personality included what he later described as "perhaps the first American dissertation written explicitly on the question of component traits of personality" (Allport, 1967, p. 9).11 Trained in social ethics as well as psychology, Allport attempted in his 1922 dissertation to define "a sound conception of human personality" on which to base "effective social service," arguing that "sound theory must underlie application" (Allport, 1967, p. 7). Rejecting as superficial many of the existing trait measures derived from exclusively practical concerns, he adopted a behavioristic definition of traits as "systems of habits" and designed measures of those traits he saw as basic components of personality.

As a postdoctoral student in Germany (1922–1923), Allport encountered psychological approaches to personality that "converted" him from his "semiflax in behaviorism" (1967, p. 12). From that time onward, he advocated structural approaches such as Gestalt psychology, Spranger's intuitive method, and Stern's person-alistic emphasis on the uniqueness and unity of personality (see, e.g., Allport, 1923, 1924a, 1924b, 1929). Stern was especially influential in shaping Allport's views (Allport, 1967): "From Stern in particular I learned that a chasm exists between the common variety of differential psychology (which he himself had largely invented...) and a truly person-alistic psychology that focuses upon the organization, not the mere profiling, of an individual's traits" (p. 10). Allport was
particularly impressed with Stern's "repudiation" of his earlier view of "personality as a sum-total of traits" in favor of an emphasis on "the total personality" (Allport, 1924a, p. 359), and Stern's influence is especially reflected in many of Allport's later (1937) views (e.g., the very definition of "trait," the concept of functional autonomy of motives, and the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic methods; see Barenbaum, 1997b).

Returning from Europe in 1924, Allport continued his efforts to define a systematic psychology of personality. Having accepted an offer to teach social ethics at Harvard, he taught what he later described as "probably the first course on the subject [of personality] offered in an American college" (Allport, 1967, p. 9). With the title "Personality and Social Amelioration," the course was first offered in 1924 in the Department of Social Ethics. The following year it was cross-listed in psychology under a new title, "Personality: Its Psychological and Social Aspects" (Nicholson, 1997b, pp. 734–735). During his time at Dartmouth (from 1926 to 1930) and later at Harvard (in the psychology department), Allport refined his definition of traits (1931) and attempted to synthesize analytic and interpretive methods of studying personality. He experimented with case methods in teaching (1929) and developed the Study of Values, an instrument based on Spranger's sixfold conception of value (Vernon & Allport, 1931).

Although personality research had proliferated during the 1920s, Allport and other commentators noted a continuing lack of attention to the development of personality theory. According to Allport and Vernon (1930), "Experimental approaches in recent years have far outgrown an adequate philosophical and theoretical background, especially in America" (p. 702). In a similar vein, Murphy (1932) commented that "those who have occupied themselves with the measurement of personality traits have in general been even less concerned with the theory of personality than most intelligence testers have been with theories of intelligence" (p. 386). Vernon (1933) attributed a lack of attention to American psychologists' preoccupation with applied issues: "The preliminary study of fundamental theoretical problems seems to have been neglected for the sake of practical results" (p. 166).

Allport's 1937 text, like his early reviews, attempted to define and systematize the field of personality psychology in order to provide "co-ordinating concepts and theories" (1937, p. ix). His survey of existing definitions of personality and methods of studying it led to a renewed emphasis on traits as the fundamental unit of study for personality. Traits, Allport suggested, were neurophysiological systems with dynamic or motivational properties. At the same time Allport's focus throughout was on "the manifest individuality of mind" (p. vii), which implied both idiographic and nomothetic methods. Although some critics considered this focus on the individual unscientific (Bills, 1938; Skaggs, 1945), most reviewers immediately recognized Allport's "precise, well-integrated, and thoughtful review" of the field of personality and his "coherent defense of the individual as a proper subject for scientific study" (Jenkins, 1938, p. 777). Even those who took issue with Allport's views agreed that the book would be influential (Guilford, 1938; Hollingworth, 1931; Jenkins, 1938).

Allport's influence on the emerging field of personality psychology and his anticipation of issues of enduring significance in personality theory and research are well known (see, e.g., Craik, Hogan, & Wolfe, 1993). We have discussed above his efforts to reconcile analytic and interpretive approaches and his emphasis on the structure and organization of the individual personality. Further, on account of his pioneering contribution to the lexical study of traits (Allport & Odbert, 1936), as well his insistence that "a theory of personality requires more than a descriptive taxonomy" of traits, John and Robbins (1993) claim Allport as the "father and critic of the Five-Factor Model" (pp. 225, 215). (We mention below the influence of Allport's concepts of motivation and the self.) Kohler (1993) has succinctly summarized Allport's importance to the field of personality:

Allport's primary contribution to the study of the person may be less a matter of theoretical notions, methodological prescriptions, or empirical work than of his uncanny ability to comprehend the major issues in the field. As early as his first papers, Allport was aware of the fundamental problems confronting those who wished to study persons, such as the problem of distinguishing between text and interpretation, the advantages and drawbacks of individual difference formulations in the study of personality structure, the fact that traits as well as environments were ever-changing, and the challenges of accounting for continuity and change in lives over time. (p. 142)
Murray: Expanding Disciplinary Boundaries

Henry Murray came to the study of personality by way of psychoanalysis and abnormal psychology. Trained originally in medicine and in biochemistry, Murray chose a career in "depth psychology" after encountering the work of Jung and Freud. Only after accepting a position as assistant director of Morton Prince's Harvard Psychological Clinic in 1926, however, did he realize that the academic psychology of the time had very little in common with psychoanalysis (Murray, 1940; Murray, 1967; Robinson, 1992; Triplet, 1992). At a time when psychologists were struggling to define and delimit the disciplinary boundaries of their field, Murray's unorthodox and divergent interests were not acceptable to proponents of a strictly scientific psychology; in fact, they almost cost him his position at Harvard (Triplet, 1983).

Murray's eclectic, multimethod approach reflected his medical training and the nonpositivist philosophy of science of Whitehead and Henderson (Laughlin, 1973; Robinson, 1992), as well as the theories of Freud and Jung. Yet at the same time, Murray's background in biochemistry permeated his work; for example, in the explicit analogy between his classification of the "variables of personality" and the periodic table of chemistry (1938, pp. 142-143). The difficulty of such an eclectic enterprise is indicated by Murray's numerous revisions of his system of personality variables (Murray, 1951, 1968, 1977) and by the tentative titles he used for these works (e.g., "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System"; Murray, 1959).

While Explorations in Personality was praised in a representative mainstream review (Elliott, 1939) as "by far the most comprehensive attempt to bring Freudian psychology and experimental psychology into line with each other" (p. 453), the tenor of the review was decidedly mixed. On the one hand, Elliott noted that as a practicing psychoanalyst, Murray was "unique among those who hold a major position in psychology in a leading American university" (p. 453). He was impressed with the new tests and procedures (especially the Thematic Apperception Test) and with Murray's analysis of the variables of personality and environment. On the other hand, Elliott suggested that psychoanalysis was unproven and unscientific and criticized Murray for overlooking existing work in experimental and differential psychology as well as for insufficient use of statistics. He considered the book's single case study too speculative.

According to Triplet (1983, 1992), Murray's work had a profound effect on the expansion of the disciplinary boundaries of personality psychology. By demonstrating the use of experimental techniques to investigate psychoanalytic concepts, by teaching courses on abnormal and dynamic psychology in a prestigious academic psychology department, and by inspiring a large number of graduate students, Murray played an important part in expanding the definition of personality psychology to include psychoanalytic theories that had earlier "had pariah status in academia" (Smith, 1990, p. 537). While he advocated the interpretive study of lives, his most enduring legacy was probably the catalog of "variables of personality" (the title of Chapter 3 of Explorations, see Danziger, 1997) and the Thematic Apperception Test (Morgan & Murray, 1935).

Murray's diagnostic council method was generally overlooked, however (McLeod, 1992). Although variants of the approach were used in later assessment settings such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Institute for Personality Assessment and Research (IPAR) at the University of California (MacKinnon, 1975), as well as in organizations such as AT&T (Bray, 1982), the practical demands of assessment even in those well-financed settings led assessors to base decisions "on statistical averages of ratings, rather than on discussion" (McLeod, 1992, p. 10). Perhaps only when executives of the very highest levels (and salaries) were to be assessed, could the full range of person-focused techniques be financially justified.

Cattell and the Measurement Imperative

The third major figure in the formative years of American personality psychology was Raymond Cattell. Cattell was born and educated in England (with an undergraduate degree in chemistry and a doctorate in psychology). He was greatly influenced by his assistantships at the University of London with Charles Spearman, "who first developed the technique of factor analysis, and later at Columbia University with E. L. Thorndike. Most of his professional career was spent at the University of Illinois, where he introduced many conceptual refinements and elaborated methodological developments, espe-
cially concerning the use of correlation, factor analysis, and other multivariate techniques, into the field of personality. Taking seriously Thorndike’s famous dictum about measurement as well as the early work on intelligence testing, Cattell prefaced his first major book on personality with the assertion that “it is on measurement that all further scientific advance depends” (1946, p. iv). He went on to argue that “the ideal of a science of personality description [is] to build its traits upon a foundation of objective test measurements, as has been done to a very large extent in the analysis of abilities” (p. 210).

**Kinds of Data**

In reviewing the extant literature on personality measurement, Cattell first distinguished among different types of data (1946, pp. 10, 210–213; chaps. 9–11): ratings by skilled judges (R data), self-ratings (S data), and measurements on tests or experimental situations (T data). (Later he added life-outcome or L data to the list; see Cattell, 1957.) He believed that in the long run, T data were the soundest; but since for the foreseeable future objective tests could not measure everything of importance, he preferred ratings (1946, p. 294).

**Kinds of Personality Traits**

Like Allport, Cattell adopted trait as the fundamental conceptual unit of personality; but at the same time he also, in the spirit of Murray, distinguished motivational or “dynamic traits” (also called ergic traits or ergs) from stylistic or “temperament traits,” as well as “ability traits.” In his view, each kind of trait had its own pattern of correlational relationships among its component variables and the external situation: Thus, dynamic trait variables “change most in response to change of incentives” and showed complex higher-order correlations, while temperament trait variables “change least in response to any change in the field” (1946, p. 167). Cattell’s major contribution to personality was his analysis of temperament traits via mathematical and statistical techniques.

**The Search for Personality Coherence through Factor Analysis**

Given the enormous array of data available to the personality psychologist—“too many variables, and too many influences behind these variables” (1946, p. 272)—Cattell turned to correlation and other multivariate techniques for clarification. Believing that the essence of a trait was co-variation or correlation, he concluded that the “most potent method of attacking the tangle is to work out correlation coefficients between the inconveniently multitudinous variables abounding in the subject and to seek some smaller number of ‘behind the scenes’ or underlying variables, known as factors” (p. 272).

Cattell’s first major investigation of personality (1945) used peer ratings of 208 men on 35 trait-word clusters derived from the exhaustive Allport and Odbert (1936) list of 4,504 traits. After carrying out a factor analysis of these data, Cattell studied various rotations and finally settled on an oblique rotation that yielded 12 factors, which were also consistent with cluster studies carried out by other investigators. (The rotations process, which could now be done on a personal computer in seconds, took 6 months!) He concluded that these 12 factors represented “the established primary traits” (1946, Chaps. 10–12).

Cattell thus introduced or established many conceptions and techniques that are an enduring part of contemporary personality psychology. His distinction between different kinds of data (especially the difference between R and S data, on the one hand, and T data, on the other) re-emerged in the 1970s dispute about the cross-situational and temporal consistency of personality (Block, 1977; Epstein, 1979). His formulation and defense of the “lexical hypothesis,” that “language covers all aspects [of personality] that are important for other human beings” (1946, pp. 215–216), prefigured the adjective-based trait assessment widely used over the next several decades. Finally, his discussion and examples of rotated factor analyses set the stage for an entire approach to personality, though there would be considerable controversy about his particular methods and assumptions. For example, Eysenck preferred orthogonal rather than oblique rotations, and so he argued that Cattell’s 12 oblique factors were really equivalent to his own three orthogonal “superfactors” of Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Yet in spite of Cattell’s general influence, few personality psychologists adopted his full views about personality measurement as outlined in his “specification equation” for predicting behavior (Cattell, 1957, pp. 302–306).
Psychometric Technology

We have seen that the prestige and apparent success of intelligence testing at the beginning of the 20th century convinced many personality psychologists that personality could (and should) be measured in a similar way, by scales of “items.” While factor analysis was the apotheosis of this ideal, the same general conviction guided the construction of numerous other scales, inventories, and questionnaires not based on factor analysis: omnibus instruments such as the Benreuter Personality Inventory, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, California Personality Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1957; 1987), Adjective Check List, and Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 1974), as well as countless scales designed to measure particular personality characteristics.

As statistical methods of scale construction and refinement became increasingly sophisticated, the psychometric rule book expanded to include matters such as test–retest reliability, internal and cross-situational consistency (Cronbach, 1951), convergent–discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), correction for attenuation, and the distinction between “trait” and “state.” Some psychologists protested that psychometric rules unduly constrained personality theorizing and research because they did not take account of nonlinear, interactive, or functionally substitutable (but not correlated) relationships among components of a concept (see Atkinson, 1982; Fleming, 1982; Winter et al., 1998). At the end of the century, the increased popularity of chaos theory and associated mathematical concepts (e.g., Vallacher & Nowak, 1997) suggested possible alternatives to the classical psychometric rules.

PERSONALITY TRAITS

In personality psychology, the concept of trait has been used to denote consistent intercorrelated patterns of behavior, especially expressive or stylistic behavior (see Winter et al., 1998, pp. 232–233). Our discussion of traits will be organized around four rather disparate topics, because these reflect the main lines of theorizing and research about traits. Perhaps the most frequently studied topic has been the number, nature, and organization of “basic” traits. Personality psychologists have used three different strategies. In approximate order of popularity, they are: factor analysis and related mathematical techniques; rational or a priori theorizing, often involving the construction of typologies; and the idiographic approach, which essentially ignores the question of “basic” traits. After discussing developments in each of these three strategies, we turn to another frequently studied topic, namely the relation between traits and biology.

Factor Analytic Study of Traits

With the availability of cheap, powerful computers, factor analysis became the method of choice for understanding traits. By the end of the century, many personality psychologists had reached a working consensus that the trait domain could be described, at least at the broadest and most abstract level, by five orthogonally rotated factors or clusters of traits (see John, 1990; also Chapter 4, this volume; McCrae & Costa, Chapter 5, this volume; Wiggins, 1996), measured in a variety of alternative ways (see Goldberg, 1992): Extraversion or Surgency, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness (often called the five-factor model or

THE FOURFOLD FLOWERING OF PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY: TRAITS, MOTIVES, COGNITIONS, AND CONTEXT

By 1946, shortly after the end of World War II, the main concepts and issues of personality psychology were established. For almost all personality psychologists, traits were viewed as a major element of personality. Many would say traits were the only personality element (e.g., A. Buss, 1989); others, however, argued for the fundamental distinctiveness and importance of motives as well (see Winter et al., 1998). Rating scales and questionnaires were firmly established as the preferred method of personality measurement, especially for traits.

Our account of the next 50 years of personality psychology is framed in terms of the four elements or classes of theory and variables and theories introduced by Winter (1996): traits, motives, cognitions, and social context. The articles in the special issue of the Journal of Personality on “levels and domains in personality” (Emmons & McAdams, 1995) offer a similar scheme for organizing personality variables.
"Big Five". Nevertheless, Eysenck and his followers (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) have continued to argue that the three factors measured by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ)—Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism—are sufficient (see the exchange between Costa & McCrae, 1992a, 1992b; and Eysenck, 1992a, 1992b). Block (1995) challenged many of the underlying assumptions (going back to Carroll’s earliest studies) of factor-analytic techniques in general as well as the five-factor model in particular.

**Alternative Analyses of Traits**

**Rationally and Empirically Constructed Scales**

Still, the five-factor model of traits had not achieved complete hegemony at the end of the century. Several personality psychologists developed trait measures based on alternative methods: Gough (1957) developed the CPI by using contrasting groups to construct scales for positive lay or “folk” concepts such as “achievement,” “sociability,” or “dominance.” In a later revision (Gough, 1987), he used clustering techniques to construct three “vectors” that bore some resemblance to Eysenck’s three factors. Scales of the PRF were labeled with the names of the Murray needs, although they appeared to function essentially as traits.

**Typologies**

From time to time, personality psychologists have proposed certain syndromes or types, or coherent bundles of personality characteristics that define an interesting pattern. The Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962; see also Thorne & Gough, 1991), which in the last decades of the century became one of the most widely used personality tests, was developed on the basis of Jung’s (1923/1971) typological combination of traits (Extraversion–Introversion) and predominant “functions” (thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuiting).

Jung’s typology and Gough’s vectors are both comprehensive, that is, presumed to cover all people. Other personality psychologists have used types and typologies in a more limited way, to formalize observations about interesting cases or summarize complex data patterns. For example, Freud wrote about the anal type (1908/1959a) and various character types (1916/1957). Murray (1938/1981) described an “author” type. In recent years, psychologists have used Q-sort methods and inverse (I) factor analysis to define types; for example, Block’s (1971) account of how personality develops over time, Wink’s (1992) description of different forms of narcissism, and York & John’s (1992) use of Rank’s theory to interpret patterns of adult women’s lives.

**The Idiographic Approach**

In spite of the popularity and prestige of factor analysis, the idiographic approach, which rejects the need to search for underlying “basic” trait factors and instead draws upon the broad lexicon for whatever trait adjectives fit a particular person, has continued to survive (West, 1983; Winter, 1996, Chap. 11).

**Biological Basis of Traits**

From the time of Galen’s famous theory of humors, people have speculated about links between personality, or mind, and biology, or body. For example, Freud anchored his theory in biology, and Murray (1938) defined needs as “physico-chemical” forces in the brain (p. 124). In the mid-20th-century, Eysenck began a sustained effort to link the trait factors of Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism to individual differences in nervous system structures and functioning. Early on (Eysenck, 1957, 1967), he used Pavlovian concepts of excitation and inhibition; later (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985; Eysenck, 1990), he turned to arousal and such brain structures as the reticular formation and the limbic system. Gray (1981, 1987; see also Pickering & Gray, Chapter 10, this volume) proposed an alternative factor structure of traits and a correspondingly different conception of their biological bases.

Cloninger (1991, 1998) proceeded in the opposite direction, using individual differences in chemically defined neural pathways to define scales reflecting personality traits. Heritability studies flourished as a way to estimate genetic contributions to trait differences. For all of the progress and excitement, though, definitive and replicable results linking personality and biology still remained somewhat elusive at the end of the century (see D. Buss, 1990; Zuckerman, 1991; and Winter, 1996, Chap. 14).
Chapter 1. History of Modern Personality Theory and Research

MOTIVATIONAL CONCEPTS IN PERSONALITY

The personality construct of motive is based on the fundamental postulate that most behavior is oriented toward a goal and shows intelligent variation in moving toward the goal (or away from it, with avoidance motives), in response to incentives, circumstances, opportunities, obstacles, and other current goals. Thus motives contrast with traits, for as Murray (1938, pp. 56-58) pointed out, a given motive may be associated with an indefinitely large number of quite different actions; correspondingly, the same action may serve multiple and varied goals (see also Pervin, 1983; 1989; Little, Chapter 20, this volume). Thus the concept of "alpha," which is so essential for consistency-based trait concepts, has little meaning for motives. In one form or another, the distinction between motives and traits appears in the theorizing of many personality psychologists (see Pervin, 1994; Winter et al., 1998).

Motive Concepts in the Psychoanalytic Tradition

Nature and Organization of Motives

Freud placed motivation at the center of personality. He argued that all behavior was motivated and grouped human motives into a few broad, general classes (rather than the long lists of specific "instincts" compiled by 19th-century biologists and psychologists): self-preservation; libidinal or sexual motives; and aggressive motives or "death instinct" (see Freud 1916-1917/1961-1963, 1920/1955, and 1933/1964). While such a grouping had roots in Western thought as far back as Empedocles (5th century B.C.E.), Freud's vigorous insistence on the libidinal (and later, aggressive) motivational roots of human behavior led him to impressive accomplishments in the analysis of surprising and unusual behavior, as well as cultural symbols. (Analysis of symbolism, often by psychologists who departed from psychoanalytic theory, e.g., Jung, von Franz, Henderson, Jacobi, & Jaffe, 1964, also made important contributions to cultural studies and the humanities.)

Many post-Freudian theorists rephrased Freud's dualistic motivational theory. For example, Bakan's (1966) concepts of "agency" and "communion" stimulated a good deal of empirical research (Helgeson, 1994; Wiggins, 1991; Wiggins & Trobat, Chapter 26, this volume), whereas Winter (1996, Chap. 9) linked Freud's libidinal and aggressive motive groupings to the TAT-measured affiliation and power motives.

Drawing eclecticly on psychoanalytic theory and its neo-Freudian variants and basing his conclusions on an intensive study of a group of normal adult males, Murray (1938) constructed an empirically based catalog of 20 needs or motives that have been widely accepted by later personality psychologists, either as a general list measured by questionnaires, such as the PRF, or as the basis for elaborate research programs measuring particular motives (e.g., McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953, on the achievement motive; see also C. Smith, 1992).

Related Personality Concepts Deriving from Psychoanalytic Motivational Theory

Freud's claim that all behavior was motivated naturally entailed the concept of unconscious motives, or motives that were out of awareness. To explain why motives might become unconscious, Freud postulated the structures of id, ego, and superego; to answer the question of how he introduced the notion of defense mechanisms that transform libidinal and aggressive motives in varied ways so as to render them "safe," thereby reducing anxiety. Anna Freud (1937/1946) elaborated the nature and operation of the defense mechanisms more fully.

Over the years, psychologists have carried out a good deal of experimental research to evaluate psychoanalytic theory and especially defense mechanisms such as repression (see e.g., Cramer, 1991; Eriksen & Pierce, 1968; Fisher & Greenberg, 1977; and Sears, 1943). The concept of an "unconscious," however, remained controversial, especially to such behaviorist psychologists as Skinner (1953). However, advances in the study of cognition suggested ways to understand or translate psychoanalytic concepts in terms of sophisticated mechanisms of information processing (Erdelyi, 1974, 1985; see also Kihlstrom, 1990, and Chapter 17, this volume). At the same time, the research program on subliminal psychodynamic activation by Silverman and his colleagues (Wienberger & Silverman, 1990) provided a striking demonstration of unconscious processes as well as specific psychodynamic motives. Some psychologists preferred more theoretically neutral concepts, such as "implicit"
psychological mechanisms (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), to describe these "unconscious" effects.

Intrinsic Motivation

As a reaction against what he considered to be the excessive psychoanalytic (and behaviorist) search for childhood motivational origins of adult behavior, Allport introduced the notion of the "functional autonomy" of motives (1937), by which he meant that the motives actually influencing here-and-now adult behavior are not (or are not any longer) derived from original "primitive" or "primary" drives, such as libido or childhood experiences. More formally, functional autonomy presumes an "acquired system of motivation in which the tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the acquired system developed" (Allport, 1961, p. 229).

From the beginning, the concept of functional autonomy was criticized, and it is fair to say that personality psychologists have not accepted it. However, Allport's argument certainly anticipated several important motivational developments in the latter decades of the 20th century: (1) the notion that age-graded tasks derived from cultural imperatives create "motivation" through such mechanisms as "life tasks," "goals," or "personal projects" (Cantor & Zinkel, 1990); (2) the concept of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975), which holds that activity can generate its own motivation; (3) Rogers's (1959) concept of actualization as a motivational force, i.e., that capacities create motivation; and even (4) the notion that personality develops by discontinuous "stages," or nonlinear reorganizations of what has gone before.

Measuring Motives through Thematic Apperception

Among the many novel assessment procedures introduced in Murray's Explorations in Personality, the Thematic Apperception Test or TAT (Morgan & Murray, 1935) is undoubtedly the most famous and widely used. Although psychologists developed many ways to interpret and score the TAT (see Gieser & Stein, in press), the empirically derived measures of motivation pioneered by McClelland deserve special mention (see Winter, 1998), though they have sometimes been completely ignored by some reviewers of personality assessment (e.g., Rorer, 1990, p. 698). Having been trained at Yale University during the ascendancy of Hull's rigorous behaviorism, McClelland and his associates used experimental procedures to arouse such motives as hunger and, later, achievement (McClelland et al., 1953), affiliation, and power (see C. Smith, 1992). Motive scoring systems were defined by observing the changes in thematic apperception produced by arousal.

Application to Cognate Fields

Using these thematic apperceptive measures, McClelland expanded the application of personality psychology into other social sciences. The achievement motive, for example, emerged as a major personality impetus to entrepreneurship and economic growth (McClelland, 1961; Spangler, 1992), whereas the power motive is related to charisma and management success (Winter, 1996, Chap. 5). Under certain circumstances, power motivation is associated with sympathetic nervous system arousal and thereby cardiovascular problems, lowered immune system functioning, and infectious diseases (McClelland, 1989). High power and low affiliation motives are linked to aggression and war (Winter, 1993).

Psychometric Critique

The early popularity of TAT-based motive measures diminished somewhat in reaction to criticisms about (1) low internal consistency and temporal reliability, and (2) the consistent lack of correlation between TAT measures and questionnaire measures of the presumed "same" construct. For a variety of reasons (see Atkinson, 1982; Winter, 1996, Chap. 5), many methodological canons traditionally applied to measures of traits are not fully appropriate to motive concepts and thematic apperceptive measures. Weinberger and McClelland (1990) argued that TAT and direct questionnaire measures reflected two fundamentally different motive systems—one unconscious or "implicit," the other conscious and self-attributed. The meta-analysis by Spangler (1992) supports this conclusion.

COGNITIONS AND PERSONALITY

The "cognitive revolution" of the late 1950s and early 1960s had major effects on personality (see Blake & Ramsey, 1951, for an early review). Kelly (1955) developed a cognitive theory of personality, based on the person's construct sy-
tem and dispensing completely with motivation. Although his direct influence was confined to clinical psychology and consumer psychology (Jankowicz, 1987), his indirect effect on personality was great. Several measures involving cognitive style and complexity were inspired by Kelly's ideas (Winter, 1996, pp. 198–210).\(^{16}\) and Mischel, a former Kelly student, used cognitive concepts to broaden learning theories of personality (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; see also Cantor, 1990).

Attributional Style

The development of causal attribution theory in social psychology led to a parallel concern with attributional style (or explanatory style) as a personality variable (see Weiner, 1990; Weiner & Graham, Chapter 24, this volume). Although attributions are surely related to emotions and motivation, the relationships are complex and probably run in both directions. The explanatory style concept has generated considerable research on depression, performance, health and other significant life outcomes (see Winter, 1996, pp. 269–277).

"Self"-Related Personality Variables

Although as far back as the 1930s Allport called attention to the importance of the self\(^{19}\) for personality integration and functioning, the advent of the cognitive revolution brought a proliferation of "self"-related variables in personality psychology (see Markus & Norem, 1990; Norem, Cheek, & Nolen-Hoeksema, Chapter 18, this volume): the self-concept (Wylie, 1974–1979), self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1979), self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987), and self-awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Classic early 20th-century concepts of the role of the "generalized other" (George Herbert Mead) and the "looking-glass self" (Charles Horton Cooley) were blended in with later concepts to create the symbolic interactionism approach (see Gergen & Gordon, 1968). With the advent of postmodernism and the notion of multiple selves (Gergen, 1991) came the related personality concept of a "dialogical self" (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992).

Erikson's (1950/1963) psychosocial elaboration of psychosocial elaboration of psychoanalysis was most fully developed around the concept of ego identity (Erikson, 1959/1980), which involved congruence between people's inner sense of self and the external social definition they receive. Using the identity concept, Erikson analyzed the lives of historical figures, such as Luther (1958) and Gandhi (1969). Meanwhile, Marcia and his colleagues (Marcia, Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993) developed methods for measuring different aspects of the identity concept. Given its conceptual status as a bridge between the individual and society, identity also proved particularly useful in analyzing social identity, or the role that social variables, such as gender, race, class, and nationality play in the formation of personality (see Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Tajfel, 1982). McAdams (1985) has suggested a "life story" model of identity, with power and intimacy motivation, as well as ego development, as component variables.

Finally, coincident with the "self psychology" of Kohut (1985) and perhaps Lasch's (1979) analysis of the late-century United States as a "culture of narcissism," came increased research interest in the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism (John & Robins, 1994; Wink, 1992).

The Social–Political Context of "Cognitive" Research in Personality

Research trends always develop in particular social and political contexts. Since cognitive personality theory focuses on internal processes that are in principle modifiable, rather than on objective conditions of existence, as the major mediators (if not "causes") of behavior and well-being, it is especially congenial to an individualist (rather than collectivist or contextual) perspective. If we only need to change people's perceptions, then the existing realities of status, power, and oppression will continue without critique or challenge. Thus Sampson (1981) observed that the emphasis on cognition arose at the height of the Cold War, just after the apogee of McCarthyism—a time in the United States when it was dangerous to challenge the social order and advocate change. In popular culture, this was the heyday of Norman Vincent Peale's bestselling The Power of Positive Thinking (1952), a quasi-religious exhortation to subjective self-transformation instead of political action.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF PERSONALITY

In many different (though apparently unrelated) ways, personality psychologists have long been concerned about context. Early in the 20th cen-
tury, personality came under the sway of behaviorism and the prestige of experimental research on learning. Later, the culture and personality movement stressed the broader social matrix in which personality is formed. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the situationist critique of personality caused a major crisis in the field and led to a re-examination of fundamental postulates and research methods. Finally in the 1980s and 1990s, the rise of "cultural psychology" and the influence of feminist and other critical perspectives from the humanities, as well as a more global perspective, showed signs of generating new interest in the social and cultural macrocontexts of personality.

The Influence of Behaviorism

Even as the early personality psychologists were developing questionnaire measures of certain socially important traits, the early behaviorists, such as Watson, were trying to reduce personality to conditioning and instrumental learning processes. Watson and Rayner's (1920) famous "Little Albert" demonstration had an enduring influence, despite its many methodological faults and lack of consistent replication (see Harris, 1979; Winter, 1996, pp. 531–534). At Yale University during the 1930s and 1940s, the Institute of Human Relations under the leadership of Hull tried to bring about a synthesis of psychoanalytic theory and an experimental psychology self-consciously striving for immaculate purity of method (see Marawski, 1986). One result was a series of experimental studies of psychoanalytic concepts (Stearns, 1943); another was the Miller-Dollard learning-based theory of personality (Dollard & Miller, 1950; Miller & Dollard, 1941). At the behaviorist extreme, Skinner (1953) proposed to dispense with personality theory and construct altogether, in favor of the concept of reinforcement history.

The Rise and Fall of Culture and Personality

The culture and personality movement was born in the 1930s, as anthropologists and psychoanalysts became interested in each other's disciplines (see Inkeles & Levinson, 1954; Kluckhohn, 1954). The underlying theoretical notion was that a culture's distinctive pattern of childrearing, derived from its broader characteristics and values, formed distinctive personalities in its children; thus the adults in each culture would have similar or "modal" adult personalities (see Benedict, 1946, for a culture and personality study of Japan). Early financial support came from such sources as the Social Sciences Research Council's Committee on Personality and Culture to support cross-cultural studies (e.g., Mead, 1937). Later, during World War II, culture and personality research contributed to the Allied war effort with studies of enemies (and allies), as well as methodological handbooks (e.g., examples cited in Inkeles & Levinson, 1954).

After the war, culture and personality studies of particular cultures were collected in interdisciplinary readers (Kluckhohn, Murray, & Schneider, 1953; see also Y. Cohen, 1961; and Levine, 1982). Interdisciplinary programs, such as Harvard's Department of Social Relations evolved to support the enterprise. The development of the Human Relations Area Files (Murdock, 1982) made possible cross-cultural research on personality (e.g., Whiting & Child, 1953). By the late 1950s, however, the culture and personality movement seemed to have run its course. With the hot war won and the Cold War dominated by political scientists and economists operating in an atmosphere of suspicion and orthodoxy, the intellectual climate had clearly changed. Moreover, the methodological and conceptual critiques leveled by Inkeles and Levinson (1954) met with no real response. Culture and personality research, they argued, oversimplified "culture" by assuming uniformity and homogeneity, while neglecting social structure. The field relied almost exclusively on impressionistic or small-sample methods. By the early 1960s, culture and personality had almost disappeared, although some researchers continued to develop new methods and carry out cross-cultural personality research (e.g., Barrett & Eysenck, 1984; McClelland, 1961). House (1981) offered a sophisticated delineation of the distinctive influences of social structure and culture in relation to personality.

Mischel's Critique and Personality's Response

Although its title, Personality and Assessment, was innocent enough, Mischel's book (1968) had the effect of a bombshell. Reviewing the field, Mischel claimed that the usefulness of broad dispositional personality variables had been seriously overstated, because (1) such variables did not show cross-situational or temporal consistency, and (2) they were not highly correlated.
with behavioral outcomes. The term "personality coefficient" was derivatively applied to any correlation "between .20 and .30 which is found persistently when virtually any personality dimension inferred from a questionnaire is related to almost any conceivable external criterion. . . . Generally such correlations are too low to have value for most individual assessment purposes" (Mischel, 1968, pp. 77–78). In place of the usual array of personality variables, Mischel advocated the use of a highly specific, almost idiographic, version of social learning theory. Later Mischel and Shoda (1995; see also Mischel and Shoda, Chapter 7, this volume) emphasized cognitive variables, so that his theory, along with that of Bandura (1989; see also Chapter 6, this volume), became known as social cognitive theory.

After some initial confusion and disorientation, personality psychologists found their bearings and replied (see Winter, 1996, Chap. 16). Block (1977) criticized Mischel's review of the literature as selective and partial, weighed heavily with studies involving one-shot experimental responses (Cattell's T data). Epstein (1979) showed that aggregating one-shot dependent variables across situations produced stronger relationships to personality. Funder and Ozer (1983) demonstrated that classic "situational" findings from social psychology, when expressed as correlations, were of the same magnitude as "personality coefficients." Studies showed individual differences in consistency and in the explanatory power of situational versus personality variables (see Winter, 1996, pp. 582–584), and demonstrated interaction between personality and situation—either cross-sectional (Magnuson & Endler, 1977) or temporal (Caspi, Elder, & Bem, 1987). Researchers measured the precise nature of situations (Bem & Funder, 1978) and used context variables as moderators in relating personality to behavior and outcome. Moreover, as D. Buss (1987) pointed out, personality can affect situations, through processes of selection, evocation, and manipulation.

Cultural and Cross-Cultural Psychology

During the last decade of the century, perhaps as a response to the increasing globalization of economic, social, and intellectual life, personality psychology began to be influenced by the perspectives of cultural psychology (see Cole, 1996; Cross & Markus, Chapter 15, this volume; Shweder, 1991; Shweder & Sullivan, 1990). Some researchers studied psychological processes in particular cultures; others sought a more comprehensive cross-cultural framework (see Berry, Dassen, & Saraswathi, 1997). Hofstede (1980) identified four dimensions along which cultures can be compared: individualism–collectivism, power distance, orientation to uncertainty, and gendering of male–female relations. So far, though, only the first dimension has received much attention from personality psychologists interested in culture, as for example in the discussion of "self" by Markus and Kitayama (1991).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND THE "LESSONS OF HISTORY" FOR PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

What lessons have we learned from our survey of the last century of personality psychology? What are the likely directions of future advance? Predictions are always perilous, but we permit ourselves two observations about likely future trends during the next few decades.

Importance of Context

First, we believe that personality psychology will need to pay increased attention to matters of context. Whatever the evolutionary origins, genetic basis, or physiological substrate of any aspect of personality, both its level and channel of expression will be strongly affected, in complex ways, by the multiple dimensions of social context: not only the immediate situational context, but also the larger contexts of age cohort, family, institution, social class, nation/culture, history, and (perhaps supremely) gender. We suggest that varying the social macrocontext will "constellate," or completely change, all other variables of personality—much as in the classic demonstrations of gestalt principles of perception.

To give a simple illustration (see Winter, 1996, p. 586): Personality variables, such as surgency, conscientiousness, power motivation, or attributional style may (or may not) have evolutionary, genetic, or physiological aspects. But consider how different these variables would have been expressed on the morning of June 6, 1944, by (1) a white 20-year-old American man storming "Utah" Beach during the World War II Normandy invasion, and (2) a middle-aged Japanese American woman held in an "internment camp" for U.S. citizens and residents of Japanese ancestry, in the Utah (U.S.) desert.
Most macrocontexts involve power differentials or hegemony. As a kind of “force-field” (see Lewin, 1935), social power therefore affects the formation and expression of personality. This would be obvious in many other social sciences and humanities, influenced as they have been by Foucault, deconstructionism, feminist theory, and critical theory. Although psychology has been largely isolated from these intellectual currents, we believe that the field of personality can continue to ignore them only at its peril.

Complexity of Perspective

Personality is inherently complex, the result of many interacting forces ranging from biology to history. The postmodernist perspective merely emphasizes this complexity. To consider just one personality variable: Just as there is not a single “text” in literature, so also there may not be a single “self” but rather many selves. We suggest the following analogy: Personality may come to be seen as a series of interacting elements, all existing like a series of Windows computer applications. Over time, different personality “applications” are installed, opened, moved between foreground and background, modified, closed, even deleted. Although the sum total of available “personality” elements may have limits that are specifiable (though perhaps unique for each person), the current “on-line” personality may be complex and fluid.

In other fields of science, recognition of increased complexity has led to the development of “chaos theory” or “complexity theory,” which is now being taken up by psychologists (e.g., Vallacher & Nowak, 1997). Because two basic postulates of personality psychology are (1) complexity of interaction among elements and (2) that earlier experience affects later behavior in ways that are at least somewhat irreversible (or reversible with greater difficulty than acquisition), the field seems ideally suited to take advantage of these new theoretical and methodological tools.

Diversity of People, Diversity of Personality Psychologists

A final “lesson” from the history of personality involves the background and training of many of its great figures over the past century. Consider that Freud started as a neurologist; Murray, as a surgeon with a doctorate in biochemistry; and Cattell, with an extensive background in statistics. Rogers enrolled in theological seminary before he turned to psychology. Eysenck originally planned to study physics, and Kelly was first an aeronautical engineer and then taught public speaking. Even Gordon Allport blended his studies of psychology with social ethics.

As a field, therefore, personality has been enormously enriched by the experiences and perspectives that these people brought from their original fields and interests. As our society increasingly recognizes the diversity of the persons we claim to interpret and analyze, personality psychology needs to ensure that its theorists and researchers in the 21st century are drawn from a diverse (academic and extraacademic) background and that they are given diverse experiences as a part of their professional training.

NOTES

1. This is only one possible construction; in many cultures (China, for example) it would be unusual, if not impossible, to conceive of a skin-bounded individual body without at the same time considering the family (or kin-group, tribe, neighborhood, and nation).

2. Galton’s work is one of the major foundations of correlation and psychological testing. It served his convictions that most human abilities were innate and that British civilization was inherently superior, and his advocacy of eugenics. These uncomfortable sociopolitical facts must be noted, because by shaping the ways in which questions are framed and the putatively “adequate” methods of answering them are evaluated, they may continue to exert subtle effects long after being overtly discarded. Thus the conceptions of “intelligence” implied by the methods of Galton and others influenced (from today’s perspective, seriously impeding) our understanding of the family of multiple “intelligences.”

3. Allport later tried (without success) to replace these terms with “dimensional” and “morphogenetic,” respectively (1962, p. 407).

4. Cattell’s “specification equation” is perhaps the most fully developed example (1957, pp. 302–306) of such prediction equations.

5. The history of research on the authoritarian personality is illustrative and instructive in this respect. Conceived originally as a critique of existing structures of social and economic power, it became transformed into a measure of individual pathology as it moved “from Berlin to Berkeley” (Samelson, 1993).

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8. See, for example, M. Smith (1990, p. 339).

9. A review of several studies of "character and temperament" had appeared 5 years earlier (Thorstone, 1916).

10. In 1925, when it was taken over by APA, it was renamed Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.

11. Although Allport's dissertation appears to have been the first on personality traits, a dissertation on character traits had appeared the previous year (Filer, 1921).

12. Like Galton and other early measurement theorists, Carrell endorsed the principles of eugenics (1987). His views on this topic—for example, that from an evolutionary perspective, democracy might be an "injustice and an unethical procedure" because it fosters the "parasitism" of the "less gifted" upon the "brains" of the "intelligent management and inventor types" (p. 113)—aroused considerable controversy when they became widely known in the late 1990s.

13. To this assertion, however, Carrell added an amusing postscript: "If machines had tongues they might rate human beings according to certain machine-handling traits...not...observable by or important to other human beings, while among dogs there might well be terms much concerned with the way human beings use their feet" (1946, p. 216).

14. Murray studied several additional needs less formally.

15. Some behaviorists simply ridiculed such concepts as the unconscious, whereas others tried to translate them; for example, as "behavior that has become unverbalizable, due to conflicting reinforcement contingencies."

16. Loening's concept and measure of ego development (1976), although directly drawn from psychoanalysis, shares substantial construct and empirical validity with cognitive complexity measures.

17. Later (e.g., Allport, 1961) the proprium or "essential selfhood."

18. Perhaps this support reflected a realization, on the part of significant elite groups, of growing U.S. world power and influence. In an analogous way, the waning of the British Empire in the 19th century was associated with support for the emergence of anthropology as a discipline.

19. Michels was not alone in these criticisms; Peterson (1965) and Vernon (1964) raised similar points at about the same time.

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